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Abstract 
 
In the early 2000s, we surveyed and analyzed the global repertoire of policy 
instruments deployed to protect personal data in “The Governance of Privacy.”  In 
this article, we explore how those instruments have changed as a result of 15 years of 
fundamental transformations in information technologies, and the new digital 
economy that they have produced.  We review the contemporary range of 
transnational, regulatory, self-regulatory and technical instruments according to the 
same framework, and conclude that the types of policy instrument have remained 
remarkably stable, even though they are now deployed on a global scale, rather than 
in association with particular legal or administrative traditions.  While the labels 
remain the same, however, the conceptual foundations for their legitimation and 
justification are shifting as a greater emphasis on accountability, risk, ethics and the 
social/political value of privacy have gained purchase in the policy community.  Our 
exercise in self-reflection demonstrates both continuity and change within the 
governance of privacy, and displays how we would have tackled the same research 
project today.  As a broader case study of regulation, it also highlights the importance 
of going beyond the technical and instrumental labels.  The change or stability of 
policy instruments do not take place in isolation from the wider conceptualizations 
that shape their meaning, purpose and effect.   
 
Introduction  
Political scientists naturally gravitate towards analyzing the exercise of power in 
somewhat different ways from legal scholars. As students of public, and specifically 
regulatory policy, we tend to begin by asking how an area of social life is governed, 
how problems and issues are approached by those authoritative exercises of power, 
and how policy instruments are designed and chosen. Taken together, each 
jurisdiction tends to have a repertoire of instruments, or “toolbox” from which they 
can choose different bundles of procedural and substantive tools. There is a long 
tradition of public policy literature offering typologies of instruments for policy 
design and implementation, and raising a host of fascinating empirical, comparative 
and normative questions about how policy instruments are, and should be, selected 
(e.g., Linder & Peters 1989; Howlett 2010; Hood 1981).   
We know that the repertoire of instruments associated within a particular 
policy sector does vary by jurisdiction.  Some tools are not considered compatible 
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with administrative and constitutional traditions, or the wider political culture. Policy 
design is not, therefore, a rational exercise whereby policy makers choose the best 
option from the global array of available instruments. The choice is invariably shaped 
by context-specific constraints, styles and legacies that may be formal and legal, but 
which are more often subjective, cultural and informal (Vogel 1986; Howlett, Ramesh 
& Perl 1995).  
Less clear from the literature is how the repertoire of instruments associated 
with a particular policy sector may change over time, as economic, social and 
technological conditions evolve. One would not expect the range of instruments 
developed to address a particular policy problem to be stable, either nationally or 
internationally.  But how do those instruments change, and in what respects?  Under 
what circumstances might they combine to form a regulatory regime or system that is 
more than the sum of its instrumental parts? And what discursive or rhetorical 
frameworks help to justify the adoption of particular instruments? Those are more 
challenging questions, inviting some careful historical and comparative analysis 
within and across discrete policy sectors, defined by a common policy problem. 
The protection of personal data or information privacy offers a particularly 
interesting candidate for such an analysis.  By comparison, it is a relatively new 
policy issue, elevated to state and global political agendas by the rapid and 
widespread proliferation of information and communications technologies, and the 
associated concerns over a multitude of risks associated with the capture, management 
and dissemination of personally identifiable information (PII).  As a public policy 
(rather than just a legal) problem, privacy protection (or data protection) originates in 
the 1960s (Bennett 1992).  Since that time, a range of legal, self-regulatory, 
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transnational and technological instruments have arisen, in different mixes and with 
different impacts, across the globe.     
We analyzed these instruments more than ten years ago in The Governance of 
Privacy: Policy Instruments in Global Perspective (2003; second edition 2006; 
hereafter GoP). The book combined conceptual and theoretical discussion of several 
information privacy (data protection) issues1 with empirical analysis of regulatory 
institutions and practices. It used social science and public policy perspectives to 
stretch the boundaries of the subject beyond an understanding of statutory and 
constitutional law and jurisprudence.  It also aimed to open what were then some 
relatively novel windows, by asking about the nature and social distribution of 
privacy, about how one would measure the effectiveness of privacy protection, and 
about the future of global privacy governance. In line with contemporary 
conceptualization in the field of public policy and political science, the term 
governance was used to indicate the mutual involvement of the state, societal and 
other mechanisms in any field of policy–making and implementation, and to underline 
that an overemphasis on what the state or the government does is likely to miss or 
obscure many processes and structures that contribute to policy outcomes. 
Since 2006, much has changed in the real and virtual worlds in which privacy 
governance was implicated, in the academic world that studied them, and in the policy 
world that aimed to regulate them. Mobile technologies, social media, “smart” 
everything, drones, the quantified self, and robotics were in their infancy or in pre- or 
early- rollout stages of development and use. Around the turn of the millennium, 
cloud computing, “big data”, onion routing, blockchain, the Internet of Things, 
                                                        
1 Terminology differs as between, for example the USA, where ‘information privacy’ is used more 
frequently, and European countries, where ‘data protection’ is more common. For the sake of 
simplicity, we use ‘information privacy’ throughout the paper to embrace the family of data privacy 
and data protection policy instruments in these countries and elsewhere.  
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predictive policing, and cyber-security had either not yet been conceived or had not 
solidified as socio-technical processes, terms in popular parlance, or matters for 
regulation. Many facets of the Internet and the World Wide Web were still in the 
bloom of youth when the study of their governance was first conceived in the 1990s. 
Google and Wikipedia were still in short trousers, and Facebook and Twitter had not 
yet been born. In the future lay the deep and shaping influence they have since had on 
societies, economies, the law, and everyday human relationships, and that they are 
expected to continue exerting on the protection of privacy and on regulatory regimes. 
The pattern of threats and risks to privacy, other human rights, and ethical or 
democratic values was at that time shaped by practices such as e-government, e-
commerce, e-health (themselves an advance on ‘i-‘ forms of these activities), and 
closed-circuit TV surveillance. “M-“ or networked versions of these and other 
consumer and citizen technological engagements were not yet prevalent. The 
Snowden revelations were yet to come, and malicious hacking or data breaches were 
not yet as massive and problematic as they have since become. Privacy invasion and 
protection were very rarely front-page news. Few outside technical laboratories had 
heard of “big data” analytics or algorithms, or used them in the daily life of 
businesses, policing, or the provision of government services. 
 When the first edition of GoP was published in 2003, relatively few countries 
beyond Europe had passed data protection or privacy laws, or had commissioners and 
regulatory bodies to oversee them. The European Union (EU) Data Protection 
Directive (1995) had only been implemented for a few years in Member States, and 
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and numbers (ICANN) had only come 
into being in 1996, the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (2001) was scarcely in 
being, while the International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP), and its 
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efforts to coordinate a profession of privacy professionals, was still very young. The 
EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was a thing of the far future. 
At a conceptual level, the perception of the invasion of individual privacy as a 
major human-rights issue had already been counterpoised by communitarian thinking 
(Etzioni 1999) and by a community of critical surveillance scholars, deeply skeptical 
of the ability of the concept and regimes of privacy to slow the rise of the surveillance 
society (Lyon 1994; 2001) nor to contend with broader questions of social sorting 
(Lyon 2003) and panoptic discrimination (Gandy 1993). The effects of 9/11 were just 
being felt in the emergence of new national-security, public-safety and law-
enforcement discourses undermining the claims of privacy and the importance of 
anonymity and confidentiality. The utopian, commerce-free luster had begun to wear 
off the Internet, but the dystopian slime of its dark side, the ubiquity of its 
commercialism, and the commodification of personal information had not yet swept 
the boards. In academia, conferences and networks of discourse and activity on 
privacy and its protection against surveillance were far fewer than they have been 
ever since, specialist journals and publication series were thin on the ground, and 
there were few courses or doctoral programs in which information privacy was 
foregrounded.  
A decade or more of change and the increasingly pervasive and intrusive 
processing of personal data has seen a transformation fueled by technological change 
and by governmental and commercial ambitions and imperatives. Those 
transformations raise questions about the shelf life of our attempt to make sense of the 
world of policy, practice, and institutional change. It is a commonplace to say that the 
pace of technological change outstrips the ability of law to keep up with it. But 
perhaps that technological lag has also supported alternative instruments of regulation 
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that would be more resilient and flexible, serving the interest of rights-protection 
better than the law itself.  
GoP became a landmark source within its field, gaining wide circulation and 
influence among academic researchers as well as public-policy and regulatory 
practitioners. Now that there is vastly more scholarly as well as policy attention given 
to the issues discussed in GoP, and in the light of the questions asked above, it seems 
important to evaluate its relevance to the very different circumstances of technology, 
societal practices, regulation and policy salience in the late 2010s.  That evaluation is 
not only an exercise in self-reflection, it also provides a critical “then and now” 
perspective on key theoretical and methodological questions about the definition of 
policy instruments and their stability over time. 
 
The Governance of Privacy: The Policy Instruments Approach 
 In GoP, we analyzed the variety of instruments – international, regulatory, 
self-regulatory, and technical – that were the most common “tools” inscribed in the 
policies, laws and regulatory practices of a growing number of countries. We 
evaluated these tools and their sub-categories with the aim of situating the armory of 
resources in a world of regulation that was likely to become both more global in scope 
and more joined-up in operation. Is our categorization still relevant to the regulatory 
instruments of the late 2010s? Are some of the current tools further ramifications of 
the original instruments?  Or are they more clearly innovations that respond to novel 
situations in coping with new technologies, new ways of doing business, and new 
ways of “doing” the state?  
In identifying these categories, we also saw a need to move on from 
conceptualizing them as discrete regulatory mechanisms – stand-alone tools in a 
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“toolbox”, which we thought was seen as a rather inappropriate metaphor (GoP: pp. 
207-209) – and, instead, address them as sometimes complementary and synergistic, 
and sometimes conflicting and disparate, components of “privacy regimes.”  This 
perspective added theoretical insight to what would otherwise have been a mechanical 
account of how regulation was, or could be, practiced: this law, that code, a contract, a 
talismanic normative declaration, some company’s privacy seal, a country’s 
commissioner, an opt-out button, or a judicial ruling. The privacy regimes comprised 
a number of key actors in an interdependent system embracing government policy-
makers, the regulatory body, data controllers, data subjects, technology developers 
and providers, and privacy advocacy groups (including the media). 
 We leave aside the question whether our designation of actors, their 
performances, and their relationships was adequate; a subsequent article revisited this 
territory (Raab & Koops 2009).  For the sake of clarity and the categorical stability of 
the comparative analysis, we do not attempt in this article to re-theorize the typology 
of instruments.  The main purpose is to compare then and now and to analyze how the 
tools of privacy governance have, or have not, been transformed in the light of recent 
technological practices and other changes.   Are the tools of privacy governance 
stable, or have they adapted, and in if so, in what ways? And what further lessons can 
we learn about the regulation of privacy specifically, and the analysis of regulatory 
instruments, more generally?   
 
Transnational instruments 
We addressed the transnational instruments (GoP: Ch. 4) in terms of a number of 
arenas that were then prominent loci for transnational activity as well as the founts of 
influential normative documents or regulatory pronunciations: the Council of Europe 
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(CoE), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the 
EU, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), international standards 
organizations, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, the United 
Nations (UN) was acknowledged in only one sentence. 
There was no account of transnational networks and arrangements among 
countries that shared a cultural, linguistic, or historical affinity or common 
experiences: for example, the Francophonic and Ibero-American worlds; these were 
dealt with later (Raab 2010). These looser structures can influence regulatory 
instruments through guidance and informal ‘good practice’ norms. But the way these 
subtleties might, or might have, worked out in these contexts were beyond our more 
straightforward and broad-brush approach to showing “what is out there” at the 
transnational level. The formation of these new networks and patterns of influence 
have become much more evident in the last ten years, as a far larger number of 
countries are now members of the global club of data-protecting jurisdictions. 
 That said, the basic transnational tools, and a global policy regime, have been 
relatively stable, although the EU, the OECD and the CoE have all revised and 
updated their main regulatory instruments in the 2010s. Most prominently, there is 
now the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR) and its data 
protection Directive 2016/680 regarding policing and criminal justice. The former 
replaced the Data Protection Directive 95/46 EC, while the latter replaced the 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, itself a transnational instrument that postdated 
the publication of GoP. There is also the OECD-inspired Global Privacy Enforcement 
Network (GPEN), discussed below.  
The role of international courts did not feature in GoP (nor did the effect of 
national case-law).  They are now absolutely central to national and international data 
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protection policy, and the future interpretation of many of the GDPR’s unclear 
provisions. Nothing like the momentous Schrems decision that invalidated the Safe 
Habour framework (Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner 2015), or the Google 
Spain ruling (Google v. AEPD 2014) that established the so-called “right to be 
forgotten” would ever have been contemplated when GoP was written.  Decisions of 
the ECJ and of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) continue to exert a 
strong influence over the way laws are to be applied, over the arguments for the 
necessity of their revision, and over the implementation of rights across many 
countries.  
Although the EU has been by far the most influential arena on global 
standards, other international arenas have emerged from the shadows in the past ten or 
more years. The UN has recently shown signs of greater activity, with the post-
Snowden appointment in 2015 of a Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy and a 
projected program of reports stretching into the future, and with an emphasis on 
government surveillance. The UN’s Global Pulse program (“harnessing big data for 
development and humanitarian action”) acts within the scope of the UN’s 1990 
Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files, has an 
international advisory group, and has adopted for Global Pulse purposes a set of 
privacy and data protection principles that more or less copies other well-established 
instruments of that kind (United Nations, undated). The world’s data protection 
commissioners have met annually since 1979, but their collective activity and 
interaction were barely mentioned in GoP; this network will be considered later.  
The APEC Privacy Principles were in the process of development at the time 
GoP appeared, and were mentioned briefly.  The intention was to elaborate a set of 
“Asian-made” standards for countries in the region, and to serve as an alternative 
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model for international data protection standards to that embodied in the adequacy 
regime of the EU. The principles themselves have not had the impact in the region 
that was intended. But the system of enforcement through a regime of Cross-Border 
Privacy Rules (CBPRs) to which companies can certify through specified and 
approved accountability agents is expected to be felt, as now four economies (the US, 
Canada, Japan and Mexico) have formally declared themselves participating 
economies. The APEC model represents an “organization-to-organization” approach 
to cross-border data regulation, in contrast to the “country-to-country” approach 
inherent in the EU Directive and the GDPR.  Critics are still suspicious, however, that 
the system was designed, and currently works, to undermine the stronger enforcement 
of legal standards through the EU regime (Greenleaf 2014, p.34).    
 The international standards arena and the complex process for negotiating both 
technical and management standards was widely recognized at the time as a 
potentially valuable supplement to data protection law.  In domestic and international 
arenas, standards could fill important gaps in the enforcement regime, relieve 
regulators of compliance work and serve as credible methods of certification for 
transnational transfers of data.  The International Standards Organization (ISO), the 
European Committee for Standardization (CEN), the European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI) and other bodies are still very active in the privacy and 
security realm. Perhaps the most influential have been the ISO series of 27000 
security standards, including the influential ISO/EIC 27018 on the protection of 
personally identifiable information for cloud computing. The Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers Standards Association (IEEE-SA) presides over a large 
number of processes for developing technical standards for information technology 
and robotics, information assurance, and other subjects. While there has thus been 
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extensive activity in standards organizations, the regulatory community has been 
somewhat slow to use standards as instruments of regulatory compliance.  The world 
of standards setting remains often opaque, technical and complex.    
Finally, we discussed the relationship between international data protection 
and the WTO. There had always been complaints about the economic protectionist 
motivations behind the tests within the 1995 EU Directive whereby third countries’ 
data-protection provisions were assessed for their adequacy in terms of the EU’s own 
provisions. The entire process rested on certain assumptions that these measures were 
indeed administered in a “reasonable, objective and impartial manner” so as not to run 
afoul of the non-discrimination provisions within the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS). We \ speculated, however, that at some point international data 
protection rules would be tested within the WTO; this point might be approaching 
because of the growing number of data-localization or residency measures, prompted 
in part by genuine concerns about access to personal data by US intelligence agencies, 
in the light of the Snowden revelations. For example, recent text for the prospective 
renegotiation of NAFTA suggests that US commercial and government interests align 
in preventing, as far as possible, “measures that impede digital trade in goods and 
services, restrict cross-border data flows, or require local storage of processing of 
data” (Malcolm 2017). 
Two preliminary conclusions can be reached about the current landscape of 
transnational instruments and actors. The first is, of course, that once an organization 
enters this policy arena, it is reluctant to leave.  Thus, what appeared as a mosaic of 
intersecting arenas of transnational governance in the mid-2000s now seems 
increasingly so, exacerbating issues of co-ordination and harmonization.  Second, the 
family of international regimes was largely in this policy space before the advent of 
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modern, networked, global communications. The privacy issues associated with the 
Internet are generally not worked out within the international regimes that are 
responsible for Internet governance; they are resolved (or not) within regimes that 
predate the Internet, and that have many other policy responsibilities beyond 
information privacy (Murray 2007).  
 
Regulatory Instruments  
The discussion of regulatory tools in GoP (Ch. 5) concentrated heavily upon the 
general national information privacy laws that had been enacted: some 43 by the mid-
2000s, most of them by European countries and a smattering elsewhere. Federal 
countries had also enacted sub-national legislation by this time: for example, Canada, 
Germany, and Australia. By the end of 2016, 120 separate legal jurisdictions had 
enacted information privacy laws, defined in terms of Greenleaf’s (2014, p.52) 
criteria:  a comprehensive national scope; a set of minimum data privacy principles; 
meeting a standard at least approximating the minimum provided for by the OECD 
Privacy Guidelines of 1980 and the Council of Europe Convention of 1981; and some 
official enforcement mechanisms. Many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America 
had joined the “club” over the previous decade or so (Greenleaf 2017), and there were 
others that were positioning themselves to do so. But the numbers game showing how 
many countries have adopted information privacy laws is less important than an 
acknowledgement of the growth from few to many and of their geographical spread. 
Important, too, is their diversity in scope, in their implementation machinery, and in 
their effectiveness (GoP: Ch. 9).  
We do not enter into this area of quantitative analysis except to note the 
phenomenal growth trajectory, and to point out that such analysis has the merit of 
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stimulating deeper thought on a number of issues that Greenleaf (2014) identified: 
What is a country? What is a law? What scope must a law have? What data privacy 
principles must a law include? And how effective must a law be? Finding answers 
would reveal many similarities, and probably a continuing international policy 
convergence (Bennett 1992) around a common, but probably broader, set of privacy 
principles than was present when GoP originally analyzed the situation. Within the 
EU, the GDPR can be seen as re-converging the rules interpreting the principles 
following twenty or more years in which Member States’ data protection had drifted 
somewhat apart.  
A prominent feature of regulatory instruments is the data protection authorities 
(DPAs) or supervisory bodies – charged with overarching responsibility for regulating 
information privacy. DPAs have been crucial regulatory instruments and their 
growing importance in the future is signaled in the GDPR, as is indicated below. GoP 
disaggregated their roles into prototypical components that seemed to reflect the 
reality of these agencies’ tasks and in terms of which their efficacy could be 
evaluated. With variations across them, GoP described DPAs as playing the roles of 
ombudsman, auditor, consultant, educator, negotiator, policy adviser, and enforcer. 
This seems still to be an accurate and well-recognized inventory, although for any 
DPA the resources given to each of these roles has always varied, and varies still.  
Recent scholarship has acknowledged this inventory, adapting it and highlighting 
certain roles (Bieker 2017; Barnard-Wills 2017; Hijmans 2016; Jóri 2015).  The 
typology formed the basis of the internal self-assessment by DPAs under the ‘London 
Initiative’ of 2007-08.   
There is evidence that DPAs have increased their educational activities – 
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raising public awareness, or providing guidance and advice for data controllers.  
However enforcement (order-making, sanctioning, fining) has become a more 
prominent role than before, depending upon the extent of a DPA’s enforcement 
powers. Privacy Commissioners’ offices that have relied on the pure ombuds role of 
complaints investigation and resolution rather than enforcement powers (such as in 
Australia and Canada) have been under increasing pressure to revise that model in 
recognition of the powerful institutional and technological forces that now need to be 
regulated.  Systematic research and more fine-grained analysis would be able to 
describe shifts in the patterns of role-playing within and across DPAs, and to account 
for stability and change by examining variables such as personnel, resources, the 
popular salience of privacy-related issues, pressure from the media, NGOs and 
politicians, and changes in DPA leadership. 
The effect upon DPAs of broad changes in the technological, economic and 
political drivers of information-processing activities is an unexplored subject in the 
institutional analysis of public policy; Hoofnagle’s (2016) work on the US Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) is an exemplary exception.  For example, the prevalence of 
social media gives DPAs new privacy problems to handle, as well as new 
opportunities to raise individuals’ awareness of the dangers these media pose. Major 
legislative changes, such as the GDPR, have highlighted the need for guidance among 
data controllers and processors, but have also revealed shortcomings in DPAs’ ability 
to comprehend and keep abreast of technological change in order to guide 
intelligently and deploy their resources effectively (Raab & Székely 2017). These 
changes in the world that DPAs try to regulate are likely to explain new relationships 
between DPAs and companies’ data protection officers (Bamberger & Mulligan 
2015), who often understand what privacy and its protection means in specific 
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organizational settings; as well as between them and NGOs or privacy advocates, who 
often have a better grasp of technical developments (Bennett 2008).  
The work of DPAs has, in part, expanded beyond national boundaries to the 
extent that they have developed more coordinated transnational activities. In addition 
to the need for EU authorities to co-operate under the “one-stop-shop” mechanism 
with regard to third countries, Chapters VI and VII and many Recitals of the GDPR 
provide for DPA’s co-operation, consistency, and joint operation. The enhancement 
of EU DPAs’ role may also have implications for the way non-EU DPAs act in global 
regulation, for which an important step was taken when the Global Privacy 
Enforcement Network (GPEN), embracing more than 50 national and sub-national 
regulatory authorities, was formed in 2010 to implement the 2007 OECD 
Recommendation on Cross-Border Co-operation in the Enforcement of Laws 
Protecting Privacy; it issued an Action Plan in 2012 (GPEN 2012).  
DPAs’ international visibility has also increased in terms of the creation of a 
welter of resolutions, declarations and initiatives at annual international conferences. 
These are intended to raise the profile of privacy protection on a host of topical issues 
including cloud computing, children’s online privacy, social media, standardization, 
profiling, “big data”, and search engines (Raab 2011, 2010). The long-established 
Berlin Group of regulators and experts in the telecommunications and media sector 
continues to meet, sharing knowledge, investigating issues, drafting working papers, 
and adopting resolutions (Berliner Beauftragter für Datenschutz und 
Informationsfreiheit 2013). Although the world’s commissioners form a global arena 
for exerting some influence, they may only slowly be gaining the organizational 
capacity or jurisdictional legitimacy to be counted as a vehicle of choice for shaping 
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policy instruments in the same sense as do the OECD or CoE, for instance. But the 
forging of links beyond national boundaries and the attempts to act transnationally are 
perhaps an example of bottom-up internationalization, and the early stages of 
transnational regime-formation. The GDPR permits Member States to establish other 
supervisory authorities besides DPAs, and this might influence further adjustment in 
DPAs’ roles and their alignment with other agencies’ regulatory functions.  
Data protection laws and regulatory policy have long relied on a now-familiar 
and nearly universal set of fair information principles (FIPs) or their equivalent in 
other international-level documents and in national laws. Compliance routines, 
sanctions, and commendations for good practice point to the supremacy of such 
principles although they might be interpreted and applied differently through varying 
legal enactment and enforcement. There is no shortage of guidance given by 
regulators, consultants and lawyers, but the traditional principles are hard to express 
in law and to put into practice in a consistent way across and within jurisdictions. This 
has led to some post-compliance thinking that “principles-based regulation” (PBR) 
(Black 2008; Raab 2012a) – despite its own inadequacies and paradoxes, including 
the bootstrapping dilemma of trust – might be a better route to follow in data 
protection as in, for example, financial regulation, especially in today’s fast-moving, 
technologically fuelled surveillance environment. PBR chimes with “new 
governance” thinking about breadth and flexibility, going beyond laws, rules, and 
adjudication into the realm of principles.  It is not enough to enunciate principles 
about data-handling and what the characteristics of the data need to be, but to focus 
somewhat more on contexts and norms (Nissenbaum 2010), and to address the 
broader canvas of political and organizational justifications for surveillance (Pounder 
2008).  
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Self-Regulatory and Co-Regulatory Instruments 
At the time of the writing of GoP, there was still very powerful resistance to the 
advent of information privacy law, especially for the private sector. Self-regulation or 
voluntary compliance were still forcefully advocated, especially in North America, as 
an alternative to government regulation. Thus it was argued that company and 
industry codes, and a menu of innovated techniques as well as better-understood and 
more settled avenues of law, would be preferable to the clumsiness and predictable 
obsolescence of omnibus legal regulation for information privacy that should be 
fended off by garlic, crucifix, and legal counsel. Economic self-interest as well as 
some academic analysis supported the position that the market itself would, over time, 
adjust to consumer demands for privacy protection, and that the overwhelming need 
for consumer trust in electronic commerce would lead to a gradual trading-up of 
standards (Laudon 1996).  
  Those arguments are still heard in the United States, but they are articulated 
with less frequency in other parts of the world for a number of reasons.  First, the 
rapid diffusion of information privacy law has produced a pervasive legal-compliance 
culture within global companies, and in some cases forced them to harmonize their 
standards with the highest (and normally EU) standard.   Second, comparative 
evaluations of self-regulation in this area have pointed to disappointing results, in the 
absence of a legal regulatory framework (Gellman & Dixon 2011).  Third, as major 
actors improve their privacy standards, they expose and isolate the free riders in a 
particular sector, which leads to pressure on governments to restrict market access for 
those players.   
Hence, the inventory of policy instruments that were once used to demonstrate 
voluntary compliance now tends to operate within a co-regulatory environment 
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(Hirsch 2011).  They are means to implement and supplement privacy protection law, 
nationally and internationally, and to demonstrate best practice.  That inventory has 
remained, however, quite consistent.  GoP (Ch. 6) urged a clearer typology of self-
regulatory instruments, in recognition of the imprecision of terminology and the 
indiscriminate way that words like “privacy policies”, “codes of practice”, “privacy 
standards” and so on, were appearing in company literature and on websites. A 
distinction was drawn between commitments, codes, standards and seals. It was 
argued that these instruments should be applied cumulatively: an organization should 
make a public commitment, codify it in policy, get certified by a standards body, and 
receive a privacy seal. This typology seems to hold up well in the abstract, even if 
terms like “privacy policy” are still used with great imprecision and their length and 
complexity typically baffle the average consumer.    
The distinction between self-regulation and regulation is now, therefore, 
extraordinarily difficult to draw. Tools that once served a self-regulatory purpose are 
now embraced within national and international regulatory frameworks, and serve 
more to augment and implement legal rules than to stand in opposition to them.  This 
tendency is seen most notably within the GDPR, which embraces several instruments 
– once identified with the self-regulatory environments of North America – within the 
scope of the regulatory framework. Thus codes of practice, privacy seals and 
standards, and data protection impact assessment (DPIA) all have their place and are 
to be encouraged, sometimes required, and sometimes standardized. Binding 
Corporate Rules (BCRs) were an instrument of the future ten to fifteen years ago, but 
they have now been adopted by multinational groups of companies to codify internal 
rules for the transfer of personal data within a group, and thus facilitate the 
international flow of personal data in conformity with data protection legislation. In 
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the APEC framework, Cross Border Privacy Rules (CBPRs) perform much the same 
role.  But in many respects, these instruments are no more than complex codes of 
practice that define internal standards for personal data processing, and provide 
external evidence of accountability to the relevant regulator.   
The co-regulatory model of privacy governance is most obviously now 
manifested in the update to the Safe Harbor Agreement, the EU-US Privacy Shield. 
Companies sign up to the agreement, and thereby commit to abide by its privacy 
obligations.  There is no legal requirement for any company to self-certify, but once 
they do, they thereby accept the legal consequences of not adhering to the stated 
privacy commitments, and may be liable to challenge before the FTC, and to sanction 
and fine for non-compliance (Hoofnagle 2016).    
 
Technical Instruments 
The position of technical tools in the inventory of policy instruments was not well 
established ten to fifteen years ago. They were promoted and debated within academic 
and advocacy circles, but had not become mainstream. They were add-ons rather than 
credible and proven instruments that could stand alongside transnational, regulatory 
and self-regulatory solutions. There was still considerable suspicion that technology 
could be part of the solution, rather than part of the problem. Few DPAs embraced the 
possibility of using technical instruments to enforce laws, and few regulators had the 
technical ability to grasp the complexities of modern cryptographic methods and the 
like. Technology developers’ understanding of privacy was still largely shaped by the 
concept and practice of computer security, leaving the full panoply of other privacy 
principles on one side. Some regulators as well as lawyers were apprehensive about 
the displacement of their legal guardianship of the rights underpinning data protection 
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law by mechanisms designed and deployed by specialists not steeped in a trained 
legal understanding of rights and their protection (Van Dijk et al. 2018).   
The landscape of technological tools surveyed in GoP (Ch. 7) presented three 
categories of technical instruments: embedded systemic instruments, represented by 
Lessig’s (1999) argument about the regulatory force of “code”; state policy-directed 
instruments, such as public-key infrastructures; and instruments for individual 
empowerment: those practical privacy tools that any individual could apply to encrypt 
their email, browse anonymously or pseudonymously and/or filter out cookies, 
spyware and other tracking codes. Each type is highly compatible with a governance 
approach to public policy-making and suggests different paradigms of regulatory 
theory.  Each gives rise to research questions that move the spotlight away from the 
state to the design bench and the technical laboratory, and ultimately to the data 
subject, as the agent to be assigned responsibilities in the production of regulation.   
Generalizations about trends within this field are notoriously difficult, but 
three significant shifts in the debate seem to have occurred since GoP appeared. First, 
to some extent, technical tools have become more mainstream, in the sense that most 
regulators would accept the logic of technical designs that minimize the capture of 
personal data and the dangers of identifying living individuals through intensive 
analysis.  “Data protection by design and by default”, ideas that originated from 
outside Europe, are now embraced by the GDPR.  Under certain conditions, 
organizations are now required to “implement appropriate technical and 
organizational measures for ensuring that only personal data which are necessary for 
each specific purpose of the processing are processed” (Article 25(2)), and under 
certain conditions demonstrate compliance through an accredited certification body. 
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Anonymized data means data that “does not relate to an identified or identifiable 
natural person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data 
subject is not or no longer identifiable” (GDPR, Recital 26). Pseudonymized data 
means personal data that have been processed “in such a manner that the personal data 
can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional 
information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is 
subject to technical and organizational measures to ensure that the personal data are 
not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person” (Article 4(5)). De-
identified data means data so that the data controller, given such data, is “not in a 
position to identify the data subject” (Article 11(2)).  These terms now acquire a 
status as policy concepts rather than just technical terms. 
The “PII Problem” (Schwartz & Solove 2011) and the variable definitions of 
personal data in national law were certainly recognized at the time GoP was 
published, but there was little understanding of the complexity of the issues.  The 
work of Sweeney (2000) and others was instrumental in convincing the community 
that the mere stripping of personal identifiers from a data set does not necessarily 
remove the risks of re-identification. The sophistication of contemporary re-
identification science gives a false sense that data can ever be completely stripped of 
identifying markers (Ohm 2010).  Analyzing “big data” can increase the risk of re-
identification, and in some cases, inadvertently re-identify large volumes of de-
identified data all at once.  
Those insights have led to a richer discourse about the very definition of 
personally identified or identifiable data, about what de-identification, anonymization 
and pseudonymization mean in different contexts, and about what privacy risks they 
might mitigate.  Their realism in practice, efficacy, and mathematical formulation is 
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keenly debated amongst computer scientists, statisticians and their cognate 
disciplines, and amongst some privacy legal scholars especially in the analysis of 
large datasets (Narayanan & Shmatikov 2010, Dwork 2006, Elliot et al. 2018). This 
policy-relevant debate is conducted in a rather different idiom from that used in older, 
non-technical literature on the meaning of ‘privacy’, and includes new kinds of 
experts.   
A number of scholars have investigated the contours of personal data and 
proposed more refined categories and typologies (e.g. El Emam et al. 2016). A more 
granular analysis of the risks associated with different forms of identification and re-
identification is now available.  Thus the EU’s Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party (2014) proposed ‘singling out’, or “the possibility to isolate some or all records 
which identify an individual in the dataset”; ‘linkability’, or the “ability to link at least 
two records concerning the same data subject or a group of data subjects (either in the 
same database or in two different databases)”; and ‘inference’, the “possibility to 
deduce, with significant probability, the value of an attribute from the values of other 
attributes”.  
Just as technical instruments are now more closely integrated with regulatory 
instruments, they are also now closely linked with self-regulation.   As questions of 
identification and anonymity are now recognized in part as subtle questions of degree, 
they raise the issue of the appropriate standard or level, given the context and 
sensitivity of the data.  Thus, strong de-identification protocols must be used in 
conjunction with a management framework that assesses the risks of re-identification, 
and there now are standards on de-identification, particularly in the health field (US, 
Health and Human Services 2012). Standards add a crucial element to the process of 
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de-identification, and can provide trusted confirmation, often in quantifiable terms, 
that risks have been mitigated.  
The second development is that technical instruments now enter recent debates 
about “big data” analytics not just as supplements, but also as potential alternatives to 
the privacy framework based on notice and consent, although consent plays a large 
part in the GDPR. Some have argued that “big data” analytics or “data science” 
requires that presumption to be discarded, or at least fundamentally rewritten because 
the inductive power of analytics means that new purposes will and should be found 
for personal data, if the promise of the technology is to be realized. Mayer-
Schönberger and Cukier (2013, p.173) are emphatic: “In the era of big data, however, 
when much of data’s value is in secondary uses that may have been unimagined when 
the data was collected, such a mechanism to ensure privacy is no longer suitable.”   
The US President’s Council of Advisors for Science and Technology (2014, p.36) 
concurs, saying that “notice and consent is defeated by exactly the positive benefits 
that big data enables: new, non-obvious, unexpectedly powerful uses of data”. The 
issue is magnified in the context of the Internet of Things, where inferences about 
behavior and actions are easily drawn from the capture of data from objects in our 
possession – phones, cars, household appliances, etc. Most people remain in 
ignorance of the identifiers that attach to these devices and constantly emit 
information about their personal lives. The world of big data feeds off this 
unawareness and the ambiguity about what is, and what is not, PII (Bennett et al. 
2014, pp.71-85). The business model of big data incentivizes the direct and indirect 
capture and retention of any data, by any technical means; whereas it was once 
cheaper to delete information than to retain it, the obverse is now the case (Mayer-
Schönberger 2009).  
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The third significant shift is that decisions about the individual are 
increasingly made on the basis of inferences drawn about the categorical groups to 
which we are presumed to belong. This raises serious questions about social sorting, 
discrimination, false positives and false negatives. All of these are central to the study 
of surveillance and the risks incurred and the harms inflicted by new technologies, not 
only on the individual and her privacy, but also on society and social values more 
widely (Wright & Raab 2012, 2014). On the other hand, the legitimate processing of 
personal data is structured by a context in which there is an increasingly active and 
comprehensive assessment of risk, and the newly perceived importance of risk 
analysis is reflected in the GDPR, for example. There is lively debate about how those 
risk assessments should be conducted, including their incorporation into privacy 
impact assessment (PIA) or DPIA (Wright et al. 2014); for example, those mandated 
by the GDPR.  
 
Privacy Governance and Policy Instruments Today  
We began by asking whether the tools of privacy governance outlined in GoP are still 
generally valid, and in what ways they have been transformed. Firm conclusions are 
difficult to draw. However, the broad range of developments perhaps points to two 
general claims about larger shifts in the governance landscape that are worthy of 
further empirical analysis.   
The first is that the tool categories themselves have remained quite stable.  No 
wholly new category has been invented that would suggest a major reformulation in 
the overall typology.   The tools are more widely understood and deployed, and they 
are more numerous and varied. But the range of regulatory, self-regulatory, co-
regulatory and technical policy tools in the contemporary privacy protection armory is 
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still manifest and robust. These governance approaches, and the typologies they 
generated, still have normative and comparative value in a policy-making 
environment that is pervasively affected by the latest technological practice. Such 
generic concepts and frameworks sit above the cut and thrust of the latest debates, and 
the detailed twists and turns of feverish national and international policy-making. 
On the other hand, it is certainly the case that the esteem in which each of the 
different types was held has waxed or waned in the passing years. Transnational 
instruments remain important and many have been refreshed in recent years. 
Regulatory instruments are still crucial but have been somewhat tarnished by law’s 
inability to keep up with technological change, by definitional ambiguities, and by 
weaknesses in enforcement. Co-regulatory approaches are now more prominent, in 
part owing to a more serious approach to privacy protection undertaken by many 
leading data controllers, their industry associations, and their management and 
organizational changes that elevate privacy protection to a more prominent position. 
Technical instruments and their subtypes, such as their incorporation into products 
and the ability of individuals to configure the privacy they desire, have come greatly 
to the fore, and have been augmented by new means of protecting identities. In 
addition to this ‘scorecard’, new combinations and patterns of instruments are 
discernible, reshaping and to some extent further integrating privacy regimes beyond 
individual instruments and their sub-types. 
Crucially, however, twenty years ago, the policy instruments were not globally 
understood or deployed. Rather, particular instruments were closely associated with 
particular national administrative and regulatory traditions.   Thus, there were few 
PIAs in Europe, codes of practice were only apparent in a few countries (such as the 
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UK, New Zealand and the Netherlands), and privacy-enhancing technologies were 
generally considered useful add-ons that consumers and organizations could choose as 
they wished. Now there is a common recognition that all authorities need to make 
creative use of all the available tools, and that there are mutual involvements and 
dependencies among them; this possibility was scoped in GoP (Ch. 8). The GDPR not 
only revises the 1995 Data Protection Directive to produce a single harmonized 
regulation for the entire EU, it is also a more multi-faceted instrument, embracing and 
combining policy instruments (such as PIAs, codes of practice, privacy by design and 
by default) that have tended to originate in non-European jurisdictions.  The GDPR is, 
therefore, a manifestation of the international diffusion of policy ideas and 
instruments.  These instruments do not just supplement the law; they form an integral 
part of the entire regulatory scheme.  
The second and larger claim is that the conceptual and theoretical 
underpinnings of the privacy policy instruments have been shifting in some 
discernible ways. Although the governing instruments seem quite resilient, the 
conceptual foundations of privacy governance are now quite different than they were 
15 years ago.  The definition and nature of policy instruments are rooted in their 
justifications.  Thus, a superficial similarity in labels might obscure a more 
fundamental transformation in justification and legitimation.  Our concluding section 
explores these conceptual shifts.   
The Governance of Privacy: Shifts in Conceptualization 
 We used the term ‘privacy paradigm’ to “denote a set of assumptions about a 
phenomenon or area of study that generally go unquestioned (GoP: 4).” It included 
compliance with data-protection principles deriving from the Organization for 
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European Co-operation and Development and the Council of Europe. The paradigm 
was individualistic and rights-based; one clear objective was to protect the 
individual’s right to information privacy, seen in terms of rights of correction, 
deletion and remedy, and access to her own data. The individual’s knowledge and 
consent were important legitimizing requirements for data processing, and data 
controllers had to adhere to principles of transparency and accountability for 
compliance with measures that gave effect to the other principles.    
 We can identify four important and, to an extent, interrelated developments in 
regulatory conceptualization that serve to modify or extend the privacy paradigm, or 
at least test its resilience. One is the rise of accountability as a regulatory and self-
regulatory philosophy and technique. A second is the (re-) discovery of ethics and its 
potential shaping of principles, rules and behavior in the processing of personal data. 
A third is the increased prevalence of risk- and harm-based understandings of privacy 
regulation, and their associated methodology, alongside the more rights-based 
philosophy. A fourth is the conceptualization of privacy as having a social value as 
well as being an individual right. This concluding discussion sketches these 
conceptual turns that have either challenged, enriched or undermined the privacy 
paradigm, and that serve to re-shape the configuration and application of policy 
instruments.    
Accountability can now be considered an idea ‘in good currency’ (Schon 
1973), and is highlighted in the GDPR with regard to compliance with data protection 
principles (Article 5) and to data breaches (Recital 86).  An ‘accountability principle’ 
formed part of the FIPs identified in the OECD’s 1980 Guidelines, and the 2013 
revision of the Guidelines banked more heavily on data controllers’ accountability in 
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terms of what a privacy management program should consist of, how it should notify 
regulators and data subjects in case of a data breach, and how the organization should 
be prepared to demonstrate the program to regulators or others who promote 
adherence to a code of conduct. How closely these valuable measures get to the heart 
of what accountability might mean in theory or practice is debatable. Moreover, it is 
far from clear how the disparate items that are considered by the OECD to be part of 
an accountability drive knit together: e.g., better data security, BCRs, trustmarks and 
privacy seals, and the – now defunct – EU-US Safe Harbor Framework. Nonetheless, 
an impetus has developed to improve data-controller accountability for the 
stewardship of personal data (Guagnin et al. (eds.) 2012; Hijmans 2016). This 
reflects, for example, the Madrid Resolution’s (International Conference of Data 
Protection and Privacy Commissioners 2009) emphasis on principles like 
transparency and accountability that had been underemphasized and underpowered by 
DPAs.    
 An accountability approach is also the basis of documents produced by a 
project led by a group drawn from the worlds of business, academia, law and 
regulation under the auspices of the Centre for Information Policy Leadership (CIPL) 
(Raab 2012b, 2017; Bennett 2012). The self-regulatory provenance and tone of this 
endeavor is, however, accompanied by the co-regulatory involvement of regulators. 
Continuing developments of the accountability project illustrate the emphasis on 
ethics, and appear to move closer to a more explicitly normative or ethical approach 
although still within the realm of practice and management. But another shift could be 
necessary, moving closer to an ethical grounding for principles and thence, perhaps, 
to rules and laws as regulatory instruments. Or rather, if we judge current laws to be 
already rooted in ethical precepts, to reassert and perhaps to reformulate such norms 
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after decades of largely procedural and institutional measures to establish information 
privacy and data protection as public-policy and legal concerns.  
 This, in fact, has become a discernible trend in recent years, although a 
relevant antecedent was available in the late 1990s with the analysis of ‘ethics for the 
new surveillance’ (Marx 1998), which cast doubt on the fair information principles, 
and thus on the efficacy of regulatory regimes. This move came from the more 
general field of surveillance studies, outside the information privacy or data protection 
legal academic bubble and its emphasis on laws and procedural rules. Marx asked 
twenty-nine questions about the means, contexts and purposes of data collection, -
although about half of them were not far from ones that could be answered by 
reference to existing data protection laws and principles. But they raised a host of 
issues that seemed to question the relevance of regulatory processes and instruments 
insofar as they insufficiently considered physical or psychological harm, the 
legitimacy and appropriateness of surveillance goals, and individuals’ awareness of 
data collection (Raab 2012d).  Ethical discourse has been around for a long time in 
information policy and practice (Moor 1985; Bynum 2015). “Information ethics”, 
“digital ethics”, “cyberethics” and other terms signal a partial shift from a focus on 
legal regulation to an emphasis on ethics that includes accountability and transparency 
(Raab 2017). A link to Marx’s ethical catalogue, and to accountability as well as to 
risks and harms, is evident in Wright and Mordini’s (2012) call for ethical impact 
assessment along the lines of technology assessment.   
 There are many illustrations of the new prevalence of ethics in the privacy, 
data protection, and information policy field. Perhaps most prominent is a 2015 
initiative by the European Data Protection Supervisor, strongly emphasizing the value 
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of human dignity in data protection (European Data Protection Supervisor 2015a). He 
created an Ethics Advisory Group “to explore the relationships between human rights, 
technology, markets and business models in the 21st century from an ethical 
perspective, with particular attention to the implications for the rights to privacy and 
data protection in the digital environment” (European Data Protection Supervisor 
2015b); the Group produced its report in 2018 (European Data Protection Supervisor 
2018). The European Commission had established a European Group on Ethics in 
Science and New Technologies as long ago as 1991, but in 2017 re-launched it with 
new members, one of whom also sits on the EDPS Ethics Advisory Group (European 
Commission 2017). Elsewhere, other developments can be invoked: for example, in 
the UK, the formation of ethics groups for governmental use of biometrics and 
forensics, for digital policing, and for data science, as well as the government’s 
development of an ethical framework for using digital sources of information in 
policy-making. 
 Whether this ethical clothing is just what comes down today’s fashion 
catwalk, or something more robust and capable of shifting or enriching the regulatory 
armory, cannot be foretold, but it has also begun to find a niche in the business 
sector’s development of accountability mechanisms. Thus the original work of the 
project on accountability has been taken over by the newly-formed Information 
Accountability Foundation (IAF)’s adopting the brand of “Big Data Ethics” in its 
work since 2013 (Information Accountability Foundation 2014).  The project seeks a 
“common ethical frame based on key values”, and identifies five key values for “big 
data” in a Unified Ethical Frame (UEF): “Beneficial, Progressive, Sustainable, 
Respectful, and Fair” (Information Accountability Foundation 2015a, pp. 8-10). 
 31 
“Fair” refers to enhancing beneficial opportunities and protecting against risky 
actions; the link is rather to risk analysis and not to the “fair (and lawful)” of the 
traditional data protection principles or of classical and modern political, ethical, and 
legal philosophy. Two of the remaining ethical values of the UEF are in fact also 
issues concerning risk. “Beneficial” means that an organization must define the 
benefits from their data analytics and who gains from them; risks have to be balanced 
by benefits. “Progressive” means that the value given by the analytics must be better 
than if they were not used, and that less intensive, less risky processing should be 
used where they achieve the same gains.  
 From these values – although not necessarily uniquely from them – many 
questions are generated that, the project claims, need to be addressed. Some of these 
would indeed be novel for information-system practitioners: who benefits from, and 
who is at risk from, data analytics? How should important values and rights beyond 
privacy be taken into consideration? Should organizations aim to minimize the risks? 
How can all the interests of all who are affected by an application of data analytics be 
comprehended? How can beneficial opportunities be enhanced? These are serious 
questions that might indeed help to reposition thinking about data protection as 
something more than a legal compliance routine, and that might even engender a more 
sweeping analysis and a practically aimed critique of information and other 
technologies and their effects.  
 That said, this proposed new departure chimes with the EDPS’ (2015, p. 4) 
call for a “big data protection ecosystem”, “underpinned by ethical considerations”, 
and featuring four tiers: future-oriented regulation of data processing and respect for 
the rights to privacy and to data protection; accountable controllers who determine 
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personal information processing; privacy conscious engineering and design of data 
processing products and services; and empowered individuals. We can see here the 
bringing together of diverse privacy instruments and actors under the aegis of an 
ethical approach that intends to restore human dignity, and not merely legal 
compliance, to a central position.  
 Risk analysis is now considered a key to unlocking ethical values and putting 
them into practice. GoP (Ch. 3) discussed risk at some length, but risk had already 
become a focus of attention in privacy protection (Raab & Bennett 1998).  The notion 
of “sensitive data” is premised on the assumption that individuals would suffer greater 
damage if such data were misused than they would with other information deemed 
less sensitive. Some have argued that sensitivity is context-dependent, and indeed that 
privacy rights are better understood in the contexts in which personal information is 
implicated (Nissenbaum 2010). In particular, risk has always been the central element 
in the conduct of PIAs and in related systems of technology assessment and 
“responsible innovation”. But with PIA, DPIA and “privacy by design and default” 
now spreading globally and finding a place within statutory law as well as in self- or 
co-regulation, the controversial precautionary principle (Vogel 2012; Sunstein 2005) 
and anticipatory action have spread from environmental, health, and other domains of 
policy to become implanted in privacy and information policy as well.  
 Risk and harm are written prominently across the GDPR, in which, for 
example, Recital 75 refers to the “risks to the rights and freedoms of natural persons”; 
again, note the individualistic focus. Recital 76 says: “[t]he likelihood and severity of 
the risk to the rights and freedoms of the data subject should be determined by 
reference to the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing. Risk should be 
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evaluated on the basis of an objective assessment, by which it is established whether 
data processing operations involve a risk or a high risk”.   However, whether this is 
an “objective” determination, leaving no room for dispute, is highly doubtful; and in 
any case, “subjective” perceptions of risk and harm are social facts as well, ones that 
politicians, policy-makers and regulators may have to heed more than the judgments 
of soi-disant technical experts.  
 Risk, harm, and the “risk of harm” were important parts of a major report by 
the RAND Europe (Robinson et al. 2009) in their review of the EU Data Protection 
Directive. Their report never mentioned rights, stating that “[t]he widely applauded 
principles of the Directive will remain as a useful front-end, yet will need to be 
backed up with a harms based back-end, in due time, in order to be able to cope with 
the challenge of globalization and international data flows” (Robinson et al. 2009, p. 
vi). Some scholars have devised typologies of risk. As far back as 1998, 6’s (1998, pp. 
37-45) examination of privacy “through the lens of risk” talks of groups of risks: of 
injustice, to personal control over collection of personal information, and to dignity by 
exposure or embarrassment, each group having many sub-categories. Solove (2008: 
Ch. 5) gives an extended catalogue of “harmful activities” grouped by four processes 
(information collection, processing, dissemination, and invasion), each with sub-
categories of specific harms.  Van den Hoven (2008) gives four types of harm that 
result from the loss of privacy: information-based harm (e.g., identity theft or fateful 
categorization), information inequality, informational injustice, and loss of moral 
autonomy.  
 No doubt, categories could be sliced and diced in many ways and include 
rights and freedoms (Wright & Raab 2014); the point is not to find an exclusive and 
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exhaustive list, but to recognize the claim that privacy policy can devise strategies not 
only to mitigate effects but to anticipate and prevent them.  This perception may 
strongly affect the design and interrelationship of the entire array of instruments 
outlined in the GoP, and may influence the regulatory roles and strategies of DPAs.  
Where this leaves the rights-based paradigm of privacy and data protection, and how 
it relates to other understandings of the nature and purpose of data protection, needs 
further debate (Gellert 2015; van Dijk et al. 2018). Not uniquely in privacy 
applications of risk theory and analysis, epistemological and methodological problems 
are also evident (Raab 2005). 
 The fourth dimension, one that ethical approaches seem to be strengthening, is 
the conceptualization of privacy as not only an individual right or of personal value, 
but as a social or public good, such that its denial has repercussions on groups and 
categories of people and on society and the polity as well. We endorsed and 
developed this insight in GoP,  but other surveillance scholars have been more 
assertive of its importance in the light of surveillance’s discriminatory or social-
sorting effects. Indeed, this understanding is not entirely absent amongst privacy 
advocates and regulators as well, although the extent to which they can embrace it is 
constrained by the persistence of the individualistic and rights-oriented paradigm. Yet 
it is possible to envisage, for example, PIAs stretching to comprehend impacts on 
trans-individual interests and values, as some have recently argued (Raab & Wright 
2012; Wright & Raab 2012, 2014).  The arrival of these forms of assessment through 
the GDPR may stimulate such fresh thinking beyond the existing approaches to 
impact assessment developed in the English-speaking world. Discourse about harms-
based regulation might also tend in the direction of allowing wider values to be taken 
into the reckoning of harm. Indeed, recognizing the ethical importance of protecting 
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the dignity, as well as the legal rights, of social groups and categories might gain a 
purchase in regulatory practice, and give DPAs an extended scope in which to operate 
as protectors of rights and freedoms.  
 The social and political values of privacy seem well established in the 
scholarly world (e.g., Regan 1995, Solove 2008, and literature canvassed in Raab 
2012c), and perhaps needs little emphasis here. But the extent to which it has traction 
in the practical world of lawmaking, jurisprudence, administration and regulation can 
be doubted, for they seem – perhaps inescapably – wedded to the conventional 
paradigm and can rarely see ways of stretching the concept of privacy and what needs 
to be protected beyond existing routines, guidance, legal compliance, and practical 
management.  The GDPR mentions the phrase “social disadvantage” only once 
(Recital 75) and does not address this point. The “data subject” is, implicitly, just that: 
not a member of a group or a category sharing collective privacy interests that can be 
defended and pursued as such; class actions on her behalf are very rare in this field, 
although Article 80 and Recital 142 of the GDPR open an avenue to the 
representation of an individual complainant by a not-for-profit organization even 
without the individual’s mandate to the organization to do so. She has rights, of 
course; but the social and political importance of exercising those rights seems 
equally undervalued, although not, it seems, in countries with current or former 
authoritarian or totalitarian governments, where it is highly prized.  Thus, we are left 
with what seems a continuing bifurcation of understandings, and this will be 
problematic in privacy and data protection for some time to come. 
In Conclusion 
The privacy paradigm that framed the nature of information privacy and its 
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regulation, and underpinned legislation and its implementation, was based on a 
conception of privacy as an individual human right. It shaped the landscape for 
protection in terms of the basic principles outlined in leading documents such as the 
1980 OECD Guidelines and the 1981 CoE Convention. It enjoined data controllers to 
fulfill certain obligations and gave rights to data subjects that could form the basis for 
complaints to DPAs and ultimately for litigation. The context for the paradigm was a 
much simpler information environment than has evolved since the 1980s. It was one 
in which individuals as citizens and consumers could realistically aspire to 
“informational self-determination”, although in most cases that aspiration remained a 
forlorn hope.  
 The array of new conceptual departures that have come into view since the 
appearance of GoP seems to attest to some dissatisfaction with the premises and/or 
the incompleteness of the paradigm. Deficiencies in the implementation of 
accountability; the underdevelopment of risk as a major concept of relevance; the 
ethical implications of data processing and surveillance that go beyond the reach of 
the law; and the failure of conventional approaches to come to grips with trans-
individual values that are affected by digital phenomena, all seem to have given rise 
to fresh thinking and practical innovation.  
 Although the privacy paradigm has not been fundamentally discredited, there 
are arguably rifts and tensions represented by some profound debates about risk, 
accountability, ethics and the social value of privacy. There is also a broader political, 
ethical, and social-policy discourse about state surveillance and the central role that 
privacy plays in a democratic society that overshadows the more particular and 
pragmatic search for more effective and efficient policy tools and regulatory 
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relationships that would fulfill the classical aims of protecting personal information.  
A related implication of the proliferation of different policy instruments 
around the world is that distinctions between regulatory and self-regulatory modes of 
privacy protection are now far more different to draw.  As we noted, the repertoire of 
instruments is now globally, rather than nationally, defined.  It could even be 
hypothesized that the governance of privacy everywhere is now based on a co-
regulatory model in which regulators give organizations advice and guidance about 
how and when to deploy tools, and stand in the background ready to enforce and 
sanction, if necessary. Organizations, for their part, are expected to demonstrate a 
capacity to comply with law, so that if they are investigated they can point to the 
DPIA, the code of practice, the care and attention of company management, the 
anonymization mechanisms, and perhaps the external certification, as evidence of due 
diligence.  
For scholars of public policy and regulatory governance, the broader lessons 
of our analysis suggest that policy instruments should never be unhinged from their 
conceptual and theoretical underpinnings.  Questions about the change or stability of 
policy instruments does not take place in isolation from the wider perspectives that 
give meaning and purpose to the shaping and choice of these tools. But these 
conceptual shifts do not all pull in the same direction, and some of them might even 
threaten to cast aside long-standing and totemic principles that are engrained in the 
privacy and data protection systems that have proliferated for the past fifty years or 
more.   
An organizational code of practice, for example, can operate as a very 
different policy instrument depending on whether it is regarded as a tool of 
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accountability, a strategy to mitigate risk, or a way to generate a more ethical 
sensibility among employees.  An encryption tool, likewise, fulfils different functions 
in a privacy regime depending on whether it advances an individual right to privacy, 
or a social justification of good computing practice.  Even a data protection law is 
going to operate differently depending on whether it was passed to satisfy 
international trade-related concerns, to legitimate governmental IT projects or, in a 
genuine concern to protect the privacy of citizens. In its more instrumental view of 
privacy governance, GoP, if anything, was insensitive to the deeper and different 
questions of legitimation and justification that attend the choice of policy instruments 
by individuals and organizations alike.  
What is also evident is that debates about privacy protection now play out on a 
broader stage of human values and rights, and of the development of technologies and 
information practices that threaten them. How debates about privacy protection are 
resolved now has far greater implications for the future of global communications and 
the flow of personal data, and for the very essence of the Internet. The stakes in the 
governance of privacy, and the choice of policy instruments, are now far higher – 
economically and politically – than they were when the GoP was conceived and 
written.  
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